Party Building in Urban Business Districts
【编者的话】前几天给试验班的学员推送了《Party Building in Urban Business Districts》这篇文章，当时问谁来翻译一下这篇文章，看看西方人研究中共党建的思路。王聪聪同学欣然答应翻译。在聪聪发来她的翻译之前，朱萌然同学率先发来了她的翻译文稿。我断断续续利用闲暇时间对她的翻译进行了修改，当然也是一种探讨，也欢迎大家就此展开讨论。
注：文章来自： Zhang Han, “Party Building in UrbanBusiness Districts: Organizational Adaptation of the Chinese Communist Party”, Journal of Contemporary China, 2015.Vol. 24, No. 94, pp. 644-664.
PartyBuilding in Urban Business Districts
城市商业区的党建：中国共产党的组织适应性
In order to consolidate its membershipbasis and maintain its political leadership in the non-state sector of the economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been rebuilding its primary party organizations (PPOs) in China`s urban business districts. Since residents` committees either are weak or do not exist in many urban business districts, local Party authorities create umbrella Party organizations to foster and territorially restructure PPOs. Four general models of establishing umbrella Party organizations can be found. And the CCP has been building its “service-oriented PPOs” to accommodate the needs of the business world. While such party building strategies demonstrate the resilience and adaptability of the CCP, they might also pose potential risks to the Party.
为了巩固经济领域中非公有部门的组织基础并保持政治领导，中国共产党(CCP)已经开始着手重建其在中国城市商业区的基层党组织(PPOs)。面对居民委员会在在许多城市商业区的无力或缺失状况，地方党委创造党组织的保护机制，以促进和区域性地重建“基层党组织”。现有四种建立党组织保护机制的模式可供参考。中国共产党一直致力于建立其“服务中心型基层党组织”以满足商业领域的各种需求。这一党建策略展现出中国共产党的弹性和适应性，也因此可能面临着潜在的风险。
Introduction
导语
Organizational adaptation of politicalparties is a critical subject in political science and a fundamental aspect ofpractical politics. Samuel P. Huntington argued that the resilience andadaptability of a party system is a more important factor in determiningpolitical development than the number of political parties, and theprecondition of political stability is a party system that is able tosystematically co-opt new social groups that emerge alongside modernization.[1]
政党的组织适应性是政治科学中的关键话题，也是政治实践中的基础方面。塞缪尔•P•亨廷顿认为，一个政党体系的应变能力和适应能力，而不是政党数量，是政治发展更为重要的决定因素。同时，政治稳定的前提条件是政党体系能够系统地“吸纳”伴随着现代化出现的新社会团体。
As the single ruling party in the People`sRepublic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a good case fortesting theories on the resilience and adaptability of party systems and itseffect on political stability. The CCP faces the classic dilemma for asingleruling party: should it try to co-opt more societal groups at the risk oflosing internal solidarity? The reconfiguration of Chinese society,particularly the rebirth of an entrepreneurial class and the growth of othersocial groups that are regarded as the middle class, such as urbanprofessionals, poses great challenges to the rule of the CCP. These socialgroups are usually closely associated with democratization,[2] as the cases ofthe Third Wave democracies in Asia, Europe and Latin America demonstrate. The criticalquestion for the CCP to answer is how to co-opt new social groups and sustainits one-party rule.
作为中华人民共和国唯一的执政党，中共是较好检验政党弹性和适应性及其对政治稳定影响的范例。中共面临着单一执政党的典型困境：它是否应该冒着失去内部团结的风险去努力拉拢更多的社会团体？中国社会的结构转型，尤其是企业家阶层的再生和其他被视为中产阶级的社会团体的成长，如城市专业人士，对中国共产党的领导构成了巨大的挑战。这些社会团体通常与民主化紧密联系在一起，[ 2 ]就像第三波民主化浪潮席卷亚洲、欧洲和拉丁美洲的情形相似。中国共产党要回答的关键问题是如何拉拢吸纳新的社会团体，并同时维持其一党领导。
From a historical perspective, the CCP hasalways recruited party members from the social groups that it deems mostimportant for its political missions. Since the market reforms, the CCPrecruited an increasing number of technocrats, intellectuals, college studentsand even private entrepreneurs.[3] Inparticular, this trend gained moremomentum since Jiang Zemin proposed his theoryof the “Three Represents” (sangedaibiao) in 2000. As a result, workers and peasants, the traditional socialbases of the CCP, only accounted for 29% of the Party members in 2005, comparedto 83% in 1956 and 64% in 1981.[4]
从历史的角度来看，共产党一直从那些对其政治任务最为重要的社会团体中吸收党员。市场化改革以来，中共招募越来越多的技术官僚，知识分子、大学生甚至民营企业家。[3]特别是，自2000年江泽民提出“三个代表”重要思想以后，这种趋势得到了更快的发展。结果，作为中国共产党传统社会基础的工人和农民，在党员中的占比，与1956年的83%和1981年的64%相比，在2005年仅占党员人数的29%。[4]
Changing membership basis is just one facetof the CCP`s adaptation strategies, as the CCP has been remarkably rebuildingitself since the mid-1990s on both ideological and organizational fronts. JiangZemin`s theory of the “Three Represents” indicates that the CCP has beentransforming itself away from a revolutionary party towards a pragmatic rulingparty; the CCP no longer represents only a worker-peasant alliance butbasically all social strata.[5] In addition to such ideological adaptation,non-state elites and political elites jointly devise “adaptive informalinstitutions” primarily at the local levels, through which mutual accommodationis achieved and formal institutions are modified and transformed over time.[6]These adaptations help reproduce legitimacy for theCCP and sustain the“authoritarian resilience” of the regime.[7]
调整党员构成基础只是中国共产党组织适应性策略的一个方面。因为自20世纪90年代中期以来，中国共产党在意识形态和组织领导方面都有了显著的自我更新。江泽民的“三个代表”重要思想表明：中国共产党正在由革命性政党向务实的执政党转变；共产党不再仅仅代表工农联盟，而是代表基本上所有的社会阶层。[5] 除了这种意识形态的适应性革新，来自非国有部门的精英和政治精英因地制宜的共同制定，发挥协调作用的“适应性非正式机构”，并且随着时间的推移，正式机构和制度也将被逐渐调整和转变。[ 6 ]这些改变有助于中共重建其合法性，维持其弹性威权主义的政权体系[ 7 ]。
The CCP is a Leninist party in terms oforganizational structure and principle and is distinctively characterized byits “mass line” (qunzhong luxian). The strength, resilience and adaptability ofthe CCP is very much reliant upon its pervasive primary party organizations(PPOs, jicengdangzuzhi), which are the smallest units of the Party formed inpolitical, economic, cultural and other types of organizations at thegrassroots level.[8] In order to remain in power, the CCP has to maintain itspervasive penetration of both the state and society. By looking at theconditions of the CCP`s PPOs, we may make sense of the adaptation strategies ofthe CCP.
中国共产党在组织结构和行为准则上是一个列宁主义政党，具有其鲜明的“群众路线”。党的能力、弹性和适应能力很大程度上依赖于其广泛存在于政治、经济、文化、和其他组织的基层党组织。[8] 为了保持执政能力，中共必须保持其在国家和社会中的普遍渗透。考察中共基层党组织的状况，有助于我们理解中共的组织适应性策略。
In the Mao era, the CCP adopted the modelof danwei-based party building (danwei dangjian) in urban China. The urbanChinese society was organized into danwei organizations in almost all sectors.Danwei organizations provided jobs and a variety of social welfare to urbanChinese people, such as housing, healthcare, pensions, entertainment, educationfor children, etc. Literally everybody had to be a member of a danweiorganization to survive in urban China. Under these circumstances, the CCPrealized pervasive organizational penetration in urban China by forming PPOsinside each danwei organization.
在毛泽东时代，中共在城市党建中采取了“单位制”。在绝大多数部门，中国的城市社会由单位组织起来。单位给中国城市居民提供了工作岗位和一系列社会福利，例如住房、医疗保健、养老金、娱乐和儿童教育等。只有成为某一单位的成员，才能在城市中生存。在这种情况下，中国共产党每个单位的基层党组织实现其在中国城市社会的广泛性的组织渗透。
In the reform era, the most important newsocial spaces are enterprises and social organizations in the non-state sector,which create most of the jobs for new social strata (xinshehui jieceng), suchas private entrepreneurs and professionals. These new economic and socialorganizations render the CCP`s previous model of danwei-based party buildinghelpless. [9]In response, since the early 2000s, the CCP has been creating PPOsin the non-state sector and making PPOs more responsive to local interests inan effort to expand the organizational reach of the CCP and to strengthen thecontrol over economic and human resources in the non-state sector.[10]
在改革时期，最重要的新型社会空间是非国有部门的企业和社会团体，它们为新社会阶层创造了大量的工作岗位，如民营企业家和专业人士。这些新型经济和社会组织使中国共产党之前的单位制党建模式显得些许无力。[9]作为回应，早在2000年，中共已经在非国有部门建立了基层党组织，以保证可以积极响应当地利益诉求，扩大中国共产党的组织覆盖范围，加强其在非国有部门的经济和人力资源上的控制力度。[10]
In contemporary urban China, businessdistricts are one of the main urban spaces where non-state enterprises andsocial organizations are located. PPOs formed in residents` committees (shequjuweihui), which are expected to be the central players in charge of partybuilding in residential communities, are rather weak or simply do not exist inmany urban business districts. The big challenge thus emerges: how to implementparty building in urban business districts without the assistance of residents`committees?
在当代中国城市中，商业区是非国有企业和社会组织聚集的主要城市空间之一。居民委员会设置在住宅区，主要负责社区的基层党建工作，但在在许多城市的商业区中却无能为力，或者说，商业区根本不存在基层党组织。由此形成的巨大挑战是：在缺乏居民委员会组织的情况下，如何加强城市商圈的党建工作？
While most existing research on the CCP`sparty building strategies in urban China focuses on party building in urbanresidential communities (shequ dangjian) centered around residents ‘committees,this article investigates the recent efforts of the CCP in restructuring andconsolidating its PPOs in China`s urban business districts, which local Partyauthorities and Party school scholars refer to as “party building in urbanbusiness districts” (chengshi shangquan dangjian). Based on my fieldwork inNingbo, Zhejiang and second-hand data from other major Chinese cities, thisarticle examines and compares the ways in which new PPOs are created and theoverall system of PPOs are restructured in urban business districts, as well asthe strategies PPOs adopt to appeal to the business world.
鉴于大多数既有研究考察中共以居民委员会为中心的城市社区基层党建工作，本文重点调查了中共近期在中国城市商业区重塑和巩固其基层党组织所做的努力。这项工作被地方党委和学者称为“城市商圈党建”。根据笔者在浙江宁波的实地调查及其他中国主要城市的二手资料，本文调查比较了城市商圈新型基层党组织的创建方式、重塑工作的宏观体系和基层党组织吸纳商界精英的策略。
In the following sections, this articlewill first conduct a brief retrospective study of the development of partybuilding in urban communities, which demonstrates a territorial/spatialperspective on party building. Then it will examine the conceptual developmentof party building in urban business districts. Next it will analyze thestrategies of restructuring the overall system of PPOs in urban businessdistricts, such as the three-tier system of party building, the four models ofcreating umbrella Party organizations in urban business districts, and theefforts of PPOs in strengthening their service functions. Finally it willdiscuss the implications and potential risks of the CCP`s adaptationstrategies.
在接下来的部分里，本文将首先对城市社区的党建发展做一个简要的回顾性研究，以此从领土/空间角度来论证党建工作。其次本文将研究城市商业区党建工作的概念性发展。之后，本文将分析在城市商业区重塑基层党组织宏观体系的策略，例如党建工作三级制、创建城市商业区党组织保护机制的四种模式以及基层党组织在加强服务功能方面的努力。最后，本文将讨论中共调整适应策略的意义和潜在风险。
Concluding Remarks
结语
作为中华人民共和国的唯一执政党，中国共产党的组织适应性对整个国家都有着深远的影响。作为一个列宁主义政党，中国共产党的绝大多数力量都存在于其广大的基层党组织中。城市商业区党建工作是中共所采取的加强城市基层党组织力量的策略之一。不论是以特定的区域或空间单元为基础的空间单元党建视角，还是针对两种新型团体的组织党建视角，都可以在城市商业区党建工作中找到根据。但因商业区是现代大都市的基本空间和城市管理的基本单元，因此，商圈的党建更为侧重于区域、空间性的党组织巩固。从正统的组织角度来看，这与中共之前的单位制党建模式形成了鲜明对比。加强区域空间统合能力的党建，其理论基础是处理中国社会总体的和中共党员个别的流动性问题。中共选择区域性地整合和巩固其基层党组织来处理这种流动性。不同的区域/空间（办公楼，商业区等）成为了党建工作的新型支持机构，通过这些机构，非国有部门高度流动的新社会阶层得以借助基层党组织的组织性网络部分地“稳定”在不同的区域/空间里。
It should be noted that the combination ofthe territorial/spatial perspective and the organizational perspective on partybuilding is the common feature of territorialized party building in residentialneighborhoods, business districts and industrial parks. Yet while residents`committees play a central role in party building in residential communities,the key player in urban business districts is the umbrella Party organization.Umbrella Party organizations work under the leadership of street office Partyworking committees or district-level Party committees and are responsible forfostering PPOs in the “two new” organizations in office buildings and theretail industry. Compared with Party committees in residential neighborhoods,umbrella Party organizations in urban business districts are thus morespecialized in party building.
需要说明的是，无论是区域/空间视角，还是组织视角的整合，是区域性党建工作的共同特征，不过存在着住宅区、商业区和工业区的区域分类差异而已。如果说居民委员会在住宅区的党建工作中发挥出的中心、领导作用，那么商业区的党建工作更多的表现出党组织的保护、服务机制。党组织保护、服务机制发挥处于街道办事处党委或地方各级党委的领导下，其主要职责是促进写字楼和零售业中两类新型团体中基层党组织的发展。与住宅区的基层党委相比，商业区的基层党组织的保护、服务机制在党建工作方面表现得更专业。
While restructuring PPOs, the CCP hasenhanced its service functions to stay relevant to the business world andthereby, gain support of the non-state sector for party building andrecruitment of Party members. By building “service-oriented PPOs”, the CCPseeks to convince the non-state sector that Party leadership can be perfectlycompatible with modern commercial culture and that party building is beneficialto entrepreneurs and professionals in the non-state sector. The CCP still seeksto retain its vanguard nature as it adapts to the business world by, forexample, mobilizing Party members to be role models of integrity management. Inaddition, by virtue of the CCP`s political authority and control of local stateorgans, PPOs seem to be able to cut across economic sectors and societal groupsto build up horizontal, cross-sectoral, cross-industrial and cross-professionalnetworks in urban business districts to coordinate and regulate business andfacilitate social networking for CCP members.
在重塑商业区基层党组织的过程中，中共不断提高其服务功能以与商业领域的发展保持同步，从而获得非国有部门对党建工作的支持，并做好党员吸收工作。通过建立“服务导向型基层党组织”，中共致力于向非国有部门展示党的领导能够和现代商业完美兼容，党建工作可以惠及非国有部门的企业家和专业人士。中共在适应商业领域发展的过程中，仍然努力保持其先进性，例如，动员党员发挥诚信管理的模范作用。此外，通过中共的政治权威和对地方行政机构的控制，城市商业区的基层党组织似乎有能力跨越经济部门和社会团体，建立其横向的、跨部门、跨行业和跨专业的网络，协调、规范商业发展，并有助于基层党员建立社会网络。
However, it is still too early to claimvictory for the CCP. In a polity with a single ruling party, the co-optation ofnew social groups into the single ruling party may help the party preemptorganized political opposition from the outside but might also undermine theinternal solidarity, discipline and enthusiasm of party members.[1]The CCP`soverall efforts in expanding its membership basis seem quite fruitful:systematic co-optation of non-state economic elites significantly contributesto the growth of “red capitalists”,[2] and the total number of CCP membersincreased from around 60,000,000 in 2001 to over 80,000,000 in 2011.[3] However,too rapid of an expansion might also lead to the recruitment of unqualifiedmembers that do not share the CCP`s political vision. The ideological criterionfor the CCP to evaluate potential Party members has been downplayed, and socialstatus, power and wealth of different social groups have become more importantfactors affecting the recruitment of Party members. It is understandable thatat a Central Politburo meeting in January 2013, Xi Jinping called on the CCP tocontrol the size of the Party and purge unqualified Party members.[4] For theCCP members who choose to join the Party as a result of party building in urbanbusiness districts, it is in doubt whether they faithfully believe in the CCP`spolitical vision and whether they regularly take part in Party activities inthe midst of their career development.
不过，现在就断言城市商业区基层党组织的成功，还显得有些早。在一个单一执政党的政体中，新型社会团体与单一执政党的联合，可能有助于政党较早获知党外有组织的政治抗议问题，但也有可能破坏党组织的内部团结、纪律和热情。[1]中共在扩大其党员基础的总体努力上似乎成功颇丰：与非共有部门的经济精英的系统合作，极大地促进了“红色资本家”的成长，[2]使得中共党员总人数从2001年的大约6千万增长到了2011年的8千万。[3]然而，过快的党员增长也可能使得缺乏中共政治认同的不合格党员的存在。在此过程中，中国共产党评价“准党员”的思想准则被淡化，社会地位、不同社会团体的权力和财富似乎成为影响党员吸收的更重要的因素。因此，也就可以理解为什么习近平在2013年1月中央政治局会议上，对基层党组织控制党的规模、清除不合格党员的呼吁。[4]对于那些由于城市商业区党建工作而选择加入中国共产党的基层党组织成员来说，他们是否忠诚地、信仰于基层党组织的政治理念，是否在其事业发展过程中定期参加党的活动，还有待商榷。
Some scholars have already argued that,since PPOs adopt more market-friendly practices and rhetoric to accommodate thebusiness world, PPOs` substantive politics and communist ideology becomesmarginalized, and thus the nature of the CCP as a vanguard political party isdiluted.[5] Indeed, service-oriented PPOs have to be more involved in theroutine work of social service delivery, sometimes in competition with socialorganizations working in the same fields. Yet, as stated by Zheng Yongnian, theCCP has been consciously fostering a material interest-based social order inChina and depoliticizing Chinese society.[6]Service-oriented PPOs demonstratethe CCP`s conscious efforts to depoliticize Chinese society and transform PPOsto be more responsive to the demands of ordinary Party members and societalgroups. Furthermore, the main political functions of PPOs are to mobilize themasses to support the Party-state and recruit Party members, not politicaldecision-making, recruitment of leadership, or ideological formulation.According to Huntington`s theory, China has been in the transition from arevolutionary one-party system to an established one-party system and is now inthe stage of “adaptation”. In this stage, pragmatic considerations are moreimportant than ideology and the erosion or decline of ideology is common, bothof which indicate not decay or weakness but stability and strength of theone-party system.[7] Thus, the transformation of PPOs towards a moreservice-oriented model does not seem to be fundamentally detrimental to theCCP.
一些学者较早对此提出反对，认为自从基层党组织采取更加市场友好型的行为和言辞，以容纳商业领域以来，基层党组织的实质性政治功能和共产主义意识形态被边缘化，使得中国共产党作为先锋政党的本质属性逐渐被淡化。[5]的确，服务导向型的基层党组织必须更多地参与到社会服务的日常工作中来，有时还需与同一领域的社会团体展开竞争。正如郑永年所说，中共正在中国有意识地形塑一种物质利益为基础的社会秩序，使得中国社会逐渐呈现出去政治化的景象。[6]服务导向型基层党组织一定程度上证实了中共有意识地使中国社会去政治化的努力，并且使基层党组织更加积极地响应普通党员和社会团体的诉求。此外，基层党组织的主要政治功能是动员群众支持其政权和吸收党员，而不是政治决策、党员吸纳或者意识形态宣传。根据亨廷顿的理论，中国正在从革命型一党体制向建设型一党体制转变，目前正处在“适应性调整”阶段。在该阶段，务实性的考虑比意识形态化更为重要，并且去意识形态化并意味着削弱和无力，反而是平稳和实力的象征。[7]因此，基层党组织向更加服务导向型模式转变并不意味着会对中共产生基础性的不利影响。
This article is a study of theorganizational adaptation strategies adopted by PPOs of the CCP in China`surban business districts. For a further evaluation of their actual effects,such as the number and composition of new Party members recruited as a result ofthe party building campaign, Party members` perception of Party activities andthe services provided by PPOs and their loyalty to the CCP`spolitical vision,and the actual operation conditions of PPOs, future work has to be done.
本文重点考察中共在城市商业区的基层党组织建设所采取的组织适应性策略。至于对其实际效果的进一步评估，例如商业区党建运动下吸收的新党员的数量和形式、党员对党的活动参与程度、基层党组织提供服务的看法、对中共政治理念的忠诚度和基层党组织的实际运作情况，仍需进一步的研究才能做出回答。
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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Orderin Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp.420-432.
[1] 塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿，变化社会中的政治秩序（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，2006），pp.420-432.
[2] See Bruce J.Dickson, Red Capitalists inChina: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for PoliticalChange(Cambridge, UK &New York: Cambridge University Press,2003).
[2] 布鲁斯·迪克森，中国的红色资本家：政党，私人企业家和和政治改革前景（剑桥。英国&纽约：剑桥大学出版社，2003）.
[3]Zheng Yongnian, “Interest Representationand the Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party”, Copenhagen Journal ofAsian Studies, No. 16, (2002), pp. 57-85.
[4]Samuel P. Huntington, “Social andInstitutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems”, in Samuel P. Huntington andClement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamicsof Established One-Party Systems (New York & London: Basic Books, 1970),pp. 3-47.
[5] Stanley Rosen, “The Chinese CommunistParty and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes toward Party Membership and theParty`s Image”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 24, (1990), pp.51-92;Hiroshi Sato and Keiya Eto, “The Changing Structure of Communist PartyMembership in Urban China, 1988–2002”, Journal of Contemporary China, 17(57),(2008), pp. 653-672.
[6] 斯坦利·罗森，“中国共产党和中国社会：党员受欢迎的态度和政党影像”，澳大利亚中国事务杂志，第24期，(1990), pp. 51-92; Hiroshi Sato和Keiya Eto，“中国城市中中国共产党的变化性结构，1988–2002”，当代中国，17(57), (2008), pp. 653-672.
[7] Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese CommunistParty as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation(London & New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 144.
[8] See Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism withoutDemocracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 2007).
[9]Gunter Schubert, “One-Party Rule and theQuestion of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Preliminary Thoughts on Settingup a New Research Agenda”, Journal of Contemporary China, 17(54), (2007), pp.191-204; Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig,“The Debate on Party Legitimacy inChina: A Mixed Quantitative/qualitative Analysis”, Journal of ContemporaryChina, 18(59), (2009), pp.339-358.
[10] David Shambaugh, China’s CommunistParty: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, D.C. & Berkeley, CA: WoodrowWilson Center Press & University of California Press, 2008), pp. 129-136.
